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NEGUSIE v. HOLDER: THE END OF THE STRICT
LIABILITY PERSECUTOR BAR?
Karl Goodman*
INTRODUCTION
Every spot of the [ ] world is overrun with oppression.  Freedom hath been
hunted round the globe.  Asia and Africa have long expelled her.  Eu-
rope regards her like a stranger, and England hath given her a warning
to depart.  O!  [R]eceive the fugitive, and prepare in time an asylum for
mankind.1
The purpose of American asylum law is to provide humanita-
rian relief to people displaced from their homelands.2  This hu-
manitarian goal often provokes difficult questions.  For example,
should asylum be available to those who have persecuted others?
Clearly, allowing human-rights abusers to benefit from laws drafted
to protect human rights would be perverse.  As a result, refugees3
who have persecuted others are ineligible for asylum in the United
States.4
While the persecutor bar has likely kept many human-rights
abusers from resettling in the United States, its reach may be too
expansive.  The broad language of the persecutor bar pertains
even to those who have merely “participated” or “assisted” in perse-
cution,5 which sometimes includes behavior far removed from ac-
tual persecution.  Making matters worse, the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”) mistakenly interpreted the persecutor bar using a
U.S. Supreme Court decision that involved a much harsher statute,
creating what was essentially a strict-liability persecutor bar.6
Under this construction of the persecutor bar, a refugee who as-
sisted in persecution, even under threat of death, would be barred
* J.D. candidate, Duke University School of Law (2010).  Special thanks to Profes-
sor Hans Christian Linnartz for his guidance.
1 1 THOMAS PAINE, Common Sense, in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 67, 100–01
(Moncure Daniel Conway ed., AMS Press, Inc. 1967) (1776).
2 See S. REP. NO. 96-256, at 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 141.
3 Although, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (2006), “[t]he term ‘refugee’
does not include any person who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated
in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion,” for purposes of this Article the
term is used also to refer to persecutors seeking refugee status in the United States.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 See Negusie v. Holder, No. 07-499, slip op. at 10 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2009).
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from resettlement.7
The Supreme Court cast the fate of the strict-liability persecu-
tor into doubt when it decided Negusie v. Holder on March 3, 2009.8
In Negusie, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’
decision to deny asylum to a refugee who was forced to persecute
others against his will.9  However, citing Chevron v. Natural Resources
Defense Council,10 the Court did not decide whether a strict-liability
persecutor bar was permissible under the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act and remanded to the BIA for further analysis.11  The BIA
must now decide whether to continue applying a strict-liability per-
secutor bar or to permit a duress defense.
This Note argues that the BIA should interpret the persecutor
bar subject to a duress defense.  Part I explains the evolution of the
persecutor bar, tracking its growth from the Displaced Persons Act
through Negusie.  Part II discusses possible outcomes of the Court’s
remand to the BIA and advocates the permission of a duress
defense.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PERSECUTOR BAR
A. Statutory Origins
Although the United States has a long history as a refuge for
displaced people from around the world, the Displaced Persons
Act of 1948 (“DPA”) was the first elaborate statutory scheme en-
acted to encourage the settlement of refugees within the country.12
The DPA lifted strict immigration quotas for European refugees
displaced by World War II who met the definition of displaced per-
sons.13  Congress fulfilled the humanitarian mission of the DPA
when it barred all potential refugees who had “assisted the enemy
7 Negusie v. Gonzales, 231 F. App’x 325 (5th Cir. 2007).
8 See id. (declaring Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981), inapplicable to 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)).
9 Id. at 2.
10 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (re-
quiring judicial deference to administrative interpretations of ambiguous statutes).
11 Negusie v. Holder, No. 07-499, slip op. at 11.
12 Heidi H. Boas, The New Face of America’s Refugees: African Refugee Resettlement to the
United States, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 431, 435–37 (2007) (“The United States first began
resettling refugees in 1948 after passage of the Displaced Persons Act.”); Lori K. Walls,
The Persecutor Bar in U.S. Immigration Law: Toward a More Nuanced Understanding of Mod-
ern “Persecution” in the Case of Forced Abortion and Female Genital Cutting, 16 PAC. RIM L. &
POL’Y J. 227, 230 (2007) (explaining that, along with the Refugee Relief Act of 1953,
the Displaced Persons Act (DPA) led to the admission of nearly 400,000 refugees into
the United States).
13 See Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 774, § 3, 62 Stat. 1009, 1010–11.
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in persecuting civil[ians]” or had “voluntarily assisted the enemy
forces . . . in their operations.”14  This exception targeted Nazis and
their supporters and was meant to prevent those persecutors from
seeking refuge in the United States.15  The Immigration and Na-
tionality Act of 1952 (“INA”) furthered this goal by making revoca-
ble the naturalization of refugees who obtained citizenship by
fraud or willful misrepresentation.16  This meant that any individu-
als who applied for asylum under the DPA or the Refugee Relief
Act (“RRA”) and misled immigration officials about their involve-
ment in the atrocities of World War II could have their certificates
of naturalization cancelled and could thereafter be deported, even
after gaining U.S. citizenship.17
Despite the DPA’s clear prohibition of former Nazis and those
who assisted them, tales of former concentration camp guards liv-
ing happily in the United States, along with the difficulty of deport-
ing those persecutors once they were spotted, led to the adoption
of the Holtzman Amendment to the INA.18  By the time the
Amendment passed in 1978, Nazis and their supporters had been
banned from becoming refugees in the United States for decades
under the DPA.19  However, some of those same persecutors were
able to reside in the United States and could not be deported be-
cause they entered the country under other immigration laws and
were not subject to the persecutor bar in the DPA and RRA.20  The
effort to deport persecutors was also becoming increasingly diffi-
cult because the victims and witnesses of the persecution were ag-
ing and often had trouble recalling events that occurred forty years
earlier.21
The Holtzman Amendment addressed these challenges and
provided new support for government lawyers attempting to de-
14 Constitution of the International Refugee Organization annex I, Dec. 16, 1946,
62 Stat. 3037, 3051–52, 18 U.N.T.S. 3, 20 (emphasis added) (defining “displaced per-
son”).  The DPA’s persecutor bar incorporated the definition of “displaced person”
established in the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization.  Displaced
Persons Act of 1948 § 2(b).
15 See Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, supra note 14 (bar-
ring “war criminals, quislings[,] and traitors”).
16 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (2006).
17 See id. (revoking citizenship if “procured by concealment” or “willful
misrepresentation”).
18 Walls, supra note 12, at 230; see generally Pub. L. No. 95-549, 92 Stat. 2065 (1978),
codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E)(i).
19 See Displaced Persons Act of 1948 § 13.
20 H.R. REP. NO. 95-1452, at 3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4700, 4702.
21 See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 531 nn.1–2 (1981) (detailing evi-
dentiary problems that arose in Fedorenko’s trial).
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port persecutors.22  Prior to the adoption of the Amendment, im-
migrants could be deported on the basis of their prior
participation in persecuting others only if: (a) they entered the
United States under the DPA or RRA, and (b) they would have
been excludable at the point of admission because they used fraud
or material misrepresentation in their applications for admission.23
The Amendment expanded the scope of the persecutor bar to ap-
ply to any alien who “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise partic-
ipated in the persecution of any person because of race, religion,
national origin, or political opinion.”24  If those persecutors al-
ready resided in the United States, they were now subject to depor-
tation.25  In addition, the new, broader scope of the prohibited
behavior, which remained undefined under the label of “otherwise
participated,”26 meant that the evidentiary hurdle for deportation
was now much lower than it was under the DPA, easing the burden
on government lawyers.27
The impact of the Holtzman Amendment expanded signifi-
cantly after Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980.28  The Act
used the language of the Holtzman Amendment, which was explic-
itly limited to former Nazis, to craft a bar against all persecutors.29
As a result, the ban on all those who “ordered, incited, assisted or
otherwise participated” in persecution now appears in several parts
of the INA and bars any refugee who falls within its scope.30
B. The Persecutor Bar in Action: Fedorenko v. United States
In 1980, the Supreme Court decided Fedorenko v. United States,
a landmark case that declared that the DPA’s persecutor bar ap-
plied to refugees who engaged in persecution involuntarily.31  Feo-
dor Fedorenko was a Ukraine-born soldier in the Russian Army
22 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E)(i).
23 H.R. REP. NO. 95-1452, supra note 20.
24 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E)(i).
25 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(D).
26 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E)(i) (banning those who merely participated in
persecution).
27 See Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, supra note 14, 62
Stat. at 3051, 18 U.N.T.S. at 20 (banning those who assisted in persecution).
28 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102.
29 See id. § 201(a).
30 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (precluding aliens who engaged in persecution from
receiving refugee status); see also 8 U.S.C § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i) (declaring aliens who
engaged in persecution ineligible for asylum); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E) (clas-
sifying Nazis who engaged in persecutory acts as “inadmissible aliens”); see also 8
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(i) (disallowing withholding of removal for persecutors).
31 Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 (1981).
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during World War II.32  Shortly after he was drafted, German
troops captured Fedorenko and sent him to the Treblinka concen-
tration camp where he worked as a guard until 1943.33  While
Fedorenko was at Treblinka, roughly 800,000 people lost their lives
at the camp.34  Fedorenko claimed that he was forced into service
as a prisoner of war and had no involvement in the atrocities com-
mitted inside the camp.35  Instead, Fedorenko explained that he
was merely a perimeter guard and would have been executed if he
tried to escape.36  Like many other Russian prisoners of war who
served as guards, Fedorenko wore a uniform, used a weapon, re-
ceived a stipend, and was allowed to leave the camp periodically.37
After a prisoner uprising, the Germans closed Treblinka and
shipped Fedorenko to a labor camp where he continued to work as
a guard.38  In 1945, Fedorenko was working as a warehouse guard
in Hamburg when British forces captured the city.39  Fedorenko
discarded his uniform and passed as a civilian for the next four
years.40
In 1949, Fedorenko applied for admission to the United States
as a displaced person, claiming that he had been a farmer in Po-
land until the Germans forced him to work in a factory during the
war.41  After the Displaced Persons Commission approved
Fedorenko’s application, he moved to Connecticut, where he lived
quietly for nearly thirty years.42  Seven years after being granted
citizenship, it became known that Fedorenko lied about his service
at Treblinka, and the U.S. government sought to revoke his
citizenship.43
According to the plain language of the DPA, Fedorenko’s citi-
zenship was illegally procured because he concealed his involve-
ment in “assisting the enemy in persecuting civilians.”44  However,
both the district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ap-
plied an “involuntary assistance” exception to the rule.45  The dis-
32 Id. at 494.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 494 n.2.
35 Id. at 500.
36 See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. at 500 n.17.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 494.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. at 496.
42 Id. at 497.
43 Id. at 498.
44 Id. at 515.
45 Id. at 512.
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trict court explained that failure to apply a voluntariness
requirement would “bar every Jewish prisoner who survived Treb-
linka because each of them assisted the SS in the operation of the
camp.”46  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court explained that if Con-
gress had intended to apply a voluntariness requirement, it would
have done so explicitly.47  The Court compared § 2(a) and § 2(b)
of the DPA.48  Because § 2(b) uses the word “voluntarily” and
§ 2(a) does not, the Court concluded that the absence of the word
in § 2(a) indicated Congress’s intent to apply a strict ban on all
those who assisted in the persecution of others, regardless of
coercion.49
Accordingly, instead of examining Fedorenko’s personal
moral culpability as the district court suggested, the Court focused
on the “objective effect[s]”50 of the alleged persecution to deter-
mine whether it rose to the level banned under the statute.51  In
the now-famous footnote 34, the Court attempted to define a per-
secutor bar that did not consider moral culpability and duress.
The solution to the problem perceived by the [d]istrict [c]ourt
. . . lies, not in “interpreting” the Act to include a voluntariness
requirement that the statute itself does not impose, but in focus-
ing on whether particular conduct can be considered assisting
in the persecution of civilians.  Thus an individual who did no
more than cut the hair of female inmates before they were exe-
cuted cannot be found to have assisted in the persecution of
civilians.  On the other hand, there can be no question that a
guard who was issued a uniform and armed with a rifle and a
pistol, who was paid a stipend and was regularly allowed to leave
the concentration camp to visit a nearby village, and who admit-
ted to shooting at escaping inmates on orders from the com-
mandant of the camp, fits within the statutory language about
persons who assisted in the persecution of civilians.  Other cases
may present more difficult line-drawing problems but we need
only decide this case.52
46 United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 913 (D. Fla. 1978).
47 Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. at 512.
48 Id.
49 Id. (applying the same rule as did the foreign-service officers who first inter-
preted the DPA). The testimony of a vice consul who administered the DPA in post-
war Germany revealed that, in the years following World War II, the DPA barred all
prison-camp guards from seeking refugee status, even those forced to serve against
their will. Id.
50 In re Fedorenko, 19 I. & N. Dec. 57, 69 (1984) (explaining that Fedorenko re-
quired courts to look to the objective effects of the accused persecutor’s actions, in-
stead of his subjective intent).
51 Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. at 512.
52 Id.
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Thus, if a refugee’s behavior is sufficiently persecutory, he will be
barred from asylum regardless of the severity of the coercion under
which he acted.
While the Court’s examples may provide guideposts on a con-
tinuum of persecution, they do little to resolve the problem per-
ceived by the district court.  Justice Stevens, in his dissent, noted
the confusion inherent in footnote 34’s example.  “[T]he Court
would give the word ‘persecution’ some not[-]yet[-]defined[,] spe-
cially limiting reading.  In my opinion, the term ‘persecution’
clearly applies to such conduct; indeed, it probably encompasses
almost every aspect of life or death in a concentration camp.”53
Justice Stevens provided his own factual example to reveal the flaws
in footnote 34’s continuum of persecution:
The Court’s resolution of this issue is particularly unpersuasive
when applied to the “kapos,” the Jewish prisoners who super-
vised the Jewish workers at the camp.  According to witnesses
who survived Treblinka, the kapos were commanded by the SS
to administer beatings to the prisoners, and they did so with just
enough force to make the beating appear realistic yet avoid in-
jury to the prisoner.  Even if we assume that the kapos were com-
pletely successful in deceiving the SS guards and that the
beatings caused no injury to other inmates, I believe their con-
duct would have to be characterized as assisting in the persecu-
tion of other prisoners.  In my view, the reason that such
conduct should not make the kapos ineligible for citizenship is
that it surely was not voluntary.54
To Justice Stevens, the difficulty of applying a strict-liability perse-
cutor bar, even with the help of footnote 34, was evidence of the
Court’s “strained” and incorrect interpretation of the statute.55
Nevertheless, Fedorenko has not yet been overruled.
C. Fedorenko’s Legacy
For nearly thirty years, Fedorenko stood as a bar to refugees who
participated in persecution, even if that persecution was performed
at the point of a gun.  The Court’s prediction also proved true—
difficult line-drawing problems arose in determining what sort of
behavior could constitute persecution, leading to a circuit split.56
53 Id. at 534 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54 Id. at 534–35 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (citing United States v.
Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893 (D. Fla. 1978)).
55 Id.
56 This circuit split arose over the interpretation of the Holtzman Amendment,
which courts began applying subject to Fedorenko’s strict-liability, objective-effects test
in 1983. See In re Laipenieks, 18 I. & N. Dec. 433, 464–65 (1983).
150 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:143
Some circuits interpreted the persecutor bar expansively and in-
ferred “participation in persecution” from evidence showing mem-
bership in a group known to have persecuted others.57  Other
circuits read “otherwise participated” in conjunction with “as-
sisted,” which narrowed the reach of the persecutor bar to those
who were personally involved in the persecution.58  The Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals produced the narrowest interpretation of the
persecutor bar by requiring more than mere assistance in persecu-
tion to qualify under the bar.59
While the federal appellate courts continued to disagree about
which types of behavior qualified as persecution, the BIA quietly
established precedent that applied the Fedorenko Court’s objective-
effects test to other immigration statutes.  For example, in In re
Laipenieks, the BIA applied Fedorenko’s interpretation of the DPA to
the much broader Holtzman Amendment and found that, al-
though it was a different statute, it also precluded the defense of
duress.60  According to the BIA, Congress’s failure to include an
explicit duress defense or the word “voluntary” meant that no such
defense was relevant.61  The BIA relied upon the plain language
and legislative history of the Holtzman Amendment, as well as the
construction of other immigration statutes, to conclude that the
subjective intent of an alien accused of persecution was irrelevant.
[T]he Holtzman Amendment contain[s] no reference whatso-
ever to an alien’s motivations and intent behind his assistance or
participation in the specified persecution.  On the other hand,
Congress has qualified certain other provisions of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act with an intent element.  Moreover, the
legislative history of the Holtzman Amendment . . . shows that
Congress carefully examined prior statutes relating to persons
who engaged in persecution.  Among these, for example, was
the DPA, in which Congress also showed that it was capable of
incorporating or omitting an intent/voluntariness requirement
as it deemed appropriate.  This demonstrates that Congress also
knew how to incorporate a motivation/intent requirement in
the Holtzman Amendment, yet it chose not to do so.62
One year later, the BIA decided Feodor Fedorenko’s deportation
57 See United States v. Ciurinskas, 148 F.3d 729, 734 (7th Cir. 1998); see also United
States v. Kowalchuk, 356 F.3d 456, 491 (3d Cir. 1985).
58 See Laipenieks v. INS, 750 F.2d 1427, 1431 (9th Cir. 1985); see also United States
v. Sprogis, 763 F.2d 115, 122 (2d Cir. 1985).
59 Petkiewytsch v. INS, 945 F.2d 871, 879, 881 (6th Cir. 1991).
60 In re Laipenieks, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 464–65.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 464 (citation omitted).
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appeal and applied the same test, reaffirming the application of
the Fedorenko standard to the Holtzman Amendment.63
In 1988, the BIA dramatically expanded Fedorenko’s reach be-
yond the DPA and the Holtzman Amendment.  In In re Rodriguez-
Majano, the BIA applied Fedorenko’s objective-effects test to the per-
secutor bar contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), which defines the
class of people who may be treated as refugees.64  While this statute
uses the same language as the Holtzman Amendment, it was never
targeted at former Nazis and applies instead to all refugees.65  By
attaching Fedorenko’s analysis of the DPA to the INA’s definition of
“refugee,” the BIA barred every refugee who engaged in persecu-
tion, whether coerced or willing.66  The BIA offered no explana-
tion for this dramatic expansion of the objective-effects test to all
refugees, possibly because the case dealt with the nature of perse-
cution, not the intent of the persecutor.  Nevertheless, Rodriguez-
Majano created a strict-liability persecutor bar that lasted for the
next twenty years.67
Rodriguez-Majano’s application of Fedorenko’s strict standard to
the expansive language of the persecutor bar in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42) produced widely disparate results when followed in
later cases.  Some circuits mechanically applied Fedorenko’s holding
to the persecutor bar, ruling that any persecutory behavior, no
matter how coerced, could bar aliens from eligibility for refugee
status.68  In contrast, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals used
Fedorenko’s dicta to justify a more nuanced approach that consid-
ered each refugee’s mental state.69
1. Following Fedorenko’s Holding: The Strict Standard
A prominent Fifth Circuit case, Bah v. Ashcroft, applied a strict
standard derived from Fedorenko’s holding.70  In 1995, the Revolu-
tionary United Front (“RUF”), a rebel group intent on toppling
Sierra Leone’s government, kidnapped a teenager named Amadu
63 In re Fedorenko, 19 I. & N. Dec. 57, 69 (1984).
64 In re Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 811 (1988); see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)
(2006).
65 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
66 See Negusie v. Holder, No. 07-499, slip op. at 10 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2009).
67 See id.
68 See, e.g., Bah v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2003).
69 See Hernandez v. Reno, 258 F.3d 806, 814–15 (8th Cir. 2001).
70 Bah, 341 F.3d at 351 (citing Maikovskis v. INS, 773 F.2d 435, 445 (2d Cir. 1985))
(using Fedorenko’s objective-effects test, and rejecting petitioner’s reading of a subjec-
tive element, to interpret the Holtzman Amendment).
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Bah.71  The RUF captured Bah’s village and systematically raped
and killed every villager not suited to military service.72  The attack
included the rape and murder of Bah’s sister and the incineration
of his father.73  The RUF gave Bah the option of joining the RUF
or suffering a similar fate.74  Bah attempted to escape twice but was
apprehended by government forces who thought he was a RUF re-
bel.75  Both times he was in government custody, RUF forces recap-
tured the government outpost and “liberated” Bah back into RUF
service.76  Bah finally managed to escape long enough to steal
some money and a passport and catch a flight to the United States
where he applied for asylum.77
The immigration judge, the BIA, and the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals uniformly denied Bah’s asylum claim because he had
assisted in the persecution of others.78  Over Bah’s objection that
he was never a voluntary member of the RUF, the court mechani-
cally used the objective-effects test created in Fedorenko and consid-
ered by the BIA in Rodriguez-Majano to interpret 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42).79  “The syntax of the statute suggests that the alien’s
personal motivation is not relevant.”80  Because Bah had commit-
ted violent acts as a nominal member of the RUF, the court of ap-
peals denied his asylum claim.81
2. Following Fedorenko’s Dicta: The Nuanced Approach
As Bah reveals, the objective-effects test can be applied
mechanically and without analysis of the refugee’s motivation.
Nevertheless, footnote 34 of Fedorenko kept some semblance of a
duress defense alive.82  In Hernandez v. Reno, an appeal from a BIA
decision that mechanically applied the objective-effects test, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found justification for a duress de-
fense in its reading of Fedorenko.83  Hernandez was a refugee from
Guatemala who admitted to persecuting others, including serving
71 Id. at 349.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Bah, 341 F.3d at 349–50.
76 Id. at 350.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 349.
79 See In re Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 811, 814–15 (1988).
80 Bah, 341 F.3d at 351.
81 Id.
82 Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 n.34 (1981).
83 See Hernandez v. Reno, 258 F.3d 806, 813 (8th Cir. 2001).
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on a firing squad that executed innocent civilians.84  Under the ob-
jective-effects analysis used in Bah, Hernandez would certainly be
ineligible for refugee status.  However, the court of appeals used a
different approach:
In this case, the [BIA] omitted most of the facts in the record
from its legal analysis.  It did not consider Hernandez’s uncon-
troverted testimony that his involvement with [the Organization
for People in Arms, a rebel group active in Guatemala,] was at
all times involuntary and compelled by threats of death and that
he shared no persecutory motives with the guerrillas. . . . It fo-
cused only on his being part of the group that shot at the
villagers.85
The court went on to contrast Hernandez’s behavior with
Fedorenko’s, focusing on Hernandez’s inability to flee and the fact
that he was unpaid and vastly outnumbered.86  While these factors
are relevant to Hernandez’s culpability in a moral sense, they are
inapplicable to the question of whether Hernandez objectively as-
sisted in persecution.  Like the prototypical guard mentioned in
footnote 34 of Fedorenko,87 Hernandez served as an armed soldier
and admitted to shooting at innocent civilians.88  Hernandez’s
claim that he had intentionally aimed away from the victims of a
firing squad massacre89 was analogous to Fedorenko’s claim that he
had fired in the general direction of fleeing camp inmates without
trying to hit them.90  Despite Hernandez’s similarities to
Fedorenko—the epitome of a coerced persecutor—the court in-
sisted that the BIA had incorrectly overlooked evidence of coercion
and involuntary participation:
If the record is analyzed in accordance with the Fedorenko legal
standard, Hernandez may be seen to have met his burden of
proving that he did not assist or participate in the persecution of
others.  Hernandez presented credible and uncontroverted tes-
timony that he was unaware that [the Organization for People
in Arms] was a violent guerilla organization and that he was for-
cibly recruited and compelled to join it under threats of death.
He testified that he only participated in the action at Playa
Grande [which included the massacre of fifteen civilians] be-
84 Id. at 808, 809, 814.
85 Id. at 814.
86 Id.
87 Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. at 512 n.34.
88 Hernandez, 258 F.3d at 809.
89 Id.
90 Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. at 500.
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cause he knew he would be killed if he did not.91
Because the BIA had failed to consider Hernandez’s claim that he
persecuted others only under duress, the court remanded the case
to the BIA to complete what it termed “a full Fedorenko analysis.”92
While the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals’s interpretation of
the objective-effects test appears flawed, it highlights the confusion
inherent in the Fedorenko standard.  This standard requires courts
to apply a mechanical rule that forbids consideration of duress or
coercion but simultaneously encourages inquiry into whether co-
erced behavior rises to the level of persecution.  In footnote 34, the
Fedorenko Court seems to engage in, perhaps even encourage, a sub
rosa consideration of voluntariness.93  On one side of the contin-
uum, the Court places “an individual who did no more than cut
the hair of female inmates before they were executed” as an exam-
ple of behavior that does indeed “assist” or “otherwise participate”
in persecution but nonetheless does not trigger the persecutor
bar.94  On the opposite end of that continuum exists a refugee who
behaved much like Feodor Fedorenko:
[T]here can be no question that a guard who was issued a uni-
form and armed with a rifle and a pistol, who was paid a stipend
and was regularly allowed to leave the concentration camp to
visit the nearby village, and who admitted to shooting at escap-
ing inmates on orders from the commandant of the camp, fits
within the statutory language about persons who assisted in the
persecution of civilians.95
This confusion arises because footnote 34 actually does address the
voluntariness of a persecutor’s behavior.96  Whether the guard was
armed or had money and freedom to leave the concentration
camp has little to do with the actual persecution in question.  In-
stead, these facts are indicators of the guard’s ability to resist or
flee, and they speak to the guard’s volition, rather than his objec-
tive participation in persecution.  Of the applications of the
Fedorenko standard that arose, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals’s
approach in Hernandez was perhaps the furthest from the mechani-
cal standard required by the holding of Fedorenko, but closest to the
nuanced, sub rosa approach suggested in dicta.97
91 Hernandez, 258 F.3d at 815.
92 Id. at 815.
93 Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. at 512.
94 Id. at 512 n.34.
95 Id. at 512–13 n.34.
96 Id. at 512 n.34.
97 See id.; see also id. at 517 (agreeing with the contention that “courts necessarily
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D. Negusie v. Holder: The End of the Strict-Liability Persecutor Bar?
In 2009, the Supreme Court decided Negusie v. Holder, which
examined the strict-liability persecutor bar that grew out of the
BIA’s application of Fedorenko to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).98  As in
Fedorenko, the refugee affected by the persecutor bar was a prison-
camp guard accused of persecuting others on protected grounds.99
Despite this similarity, Negusie presents a more modern iteration of
the dilemma of the persecuted persecutor.
Daniel Negusie lived in Ethiopia, his father’s home country,
until he was eighteen years old.100  In 1994, he moved to Eritrea to
visit his mother and to find work.101  A few months after arriving,
Negusie went to see a movie at his local theater.102  While he was
inside, Eritrean soldiers surrounded the theater and arrested the
moviegoers as they left the building.103  The soldiers fired upon
anyone who attempted to flee and bound everyone with rope.104
After his capture, the Eritrean government sent Negusie to
work in a salt mine.105  Soldiers forced anyone who attempted to
flee the mines to lie in the sun for three days without food or
water, a potential death sentence.106  After a month of laboring in
the salt mines, Negusie underwent six months of mandatory mili-
tary training and was conscripted into the Eritrean Navy.107  How-
ever, when war reignited between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998,
Negusie refused to fight against his father’s homeland, Ethiopia.108
Eritrean officials arrested Negusie and sent him to a prison
camp.109
Throughout the war and continuing to the present, the Eri-
trean government has persecuted its subjects for their religious be-
liefs, singling out Protestant Christians in particular.110  During his
and properly exercise discretion in characterizing certain facts while determining
whether an applicant for citizenship meets some of the requirements for naturaliza-
tion”) (citation omitted).
98 Negusie v. Holder, No. 07-499, slip op. at 2 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2009).
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Brief for Petitioner at 13, Negusie v. Mukasey, No. 07-499 (2009), available at
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/07-499_Petitioner.pdf.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 14.
106 Id.
107 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 102, at 14.
108 Id. .
109 Negusie v. Holder, No. 07-499, slip op. at 2 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2009).
110 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, INTER-
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incarceration, Negusie converted to Protestant Christianity, which
destined him for more severe persecution.111  For the mere act of
talking to fellow Christians while in prison, the guards forced
Negusie to roll on the ground while being beaten with sticks every-
day for two weeks.112  After two years of such treatment, the prison
camp’s commanding officer ordered Negusie to work as a prison
guard.113  Negusie knew that he would be executed if he attempted
to flee because two of his friends, also conscripted prison guards,
had been killed in escape attempts.114
For the next four years, Negusie lived in the prison camp as a
guard, although he was not permitted to leave.115  He carried a
gun, wore a uniform, and was responsible for preventing the es-
cape of prisoners.116  He also admitted that, under orders, he de-
nied prisoners access to showers and fresh air and witnessed other
guards force prisoners to roll on the ground in the hot sun, at least
once to the point of death.117  At the same time, Negusie refused to
personally participate in such torture because it offended his be-
liefs as a Christian.118  Although his superiors threatened him with
execution for his disobedience, Negusie periodically allowed pris-
oners to take showers at night and secretly gave them food, water,
and cigarettes.119
In 2004, after a decade of mistreatment by the Eritrean gov-
ernment, Negusie escaped the prison camp and hid himself aboard
a ship bound for the United States.120  He applied for asylum and
withholding of removal soon after arriving in the United States.
Although the immigration judge found no evidence that Negusie
was a “malicious person or that he was an aggressive person who
mistreated the prisoners,” “the very fact that he helped keep [the
prisoners] in the prison compound where he had reason to know
that they were persecuted constitutes assisting in . . . persecution
. . . and bar[red him] from relief.”121  On appeal, the BIA ex-
NATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2007: ERITREA, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/
rls/irf/2007/90096.htm (2007).
111 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 102, at 14.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 14–15.
114 Id. at 15.
115 Id.
116 See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 102, at 15.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 102, at 16.
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plained, “[t]he fact that [Negusie] was compelled to participate as
a prison guard, and may not have actively tortured or mistreated
anyone, is immaterial. . . . [A]n alien’s motivation and intent are
irrelevant to the issue of whether he ‘assisted’ in persecution . . . .
[I]t is the objective effect of an alien’s actions which is
controlling.”122
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the BIA’s decision
under the standard set in Bah and Fedorenko.123  “The question
whether an alien was compelled to assist authorities is irrelevant, as
is the question whether the alien shared the authorities’ inten-
tions. . . . Rather, the inquiry should focus “on whether particular
conduct can be considered assisting in the persecution of civil-
ians.”124  Although the court noted that “Negusie did not affirma-
tively, personally injure the prisoners, and he objected to, and
occasionally disobeyed, orders to inflict punishment, did favors for
prisoners, and was reprimanded for doing so,” his role as a prison
guard rendered him ineligible for asylum.125
In 2009, the Supreme Court decided Negusie’s case and over-
turned two decades of lower courts’ application of Fedorenko to 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).126  The majority opinion, written by Justice
Kennedy, held that the BIA mistakenly used Fedorenko to interpret
the INA’s definition of a refugee.127  However, citing principles of
Chevron deference, the Court remanded to the BIA to allow agency
reinterpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), which the Court
deemed ambiguous.128
The Court provided two reasons why Fedorenko was not control-
ling for 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).  First, Fedorenko dealt with the DPA,
which provided a voluntariness requirement in § 2(b) but not in
§ 2(a).129  Using traditional rules of statutory construction, the
Fedorenko Court interpreted the conspicuous absence of the word
“voluntary” in the persecutor bar in § 2(a) as evidence of Con-
gress’s intent to preclude a duress defense.  In the immigration
statute, however, there is no similar use of the word “voluntary,” “so
its omission cannot carry the same significance.”130
122 Id. at 17.
123 Negusie v. Gonzales, 231 F. App’x 325 (5th Cir. 2007).
124 Id. at 326.
125 Id.
126 See Negusie v. Holder, No. 07-499, slip op. at 2 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2009).
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 7 (explaining the Fedorenko Court’s interpretation of the DPA, Fedorenko
v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 (1981)).
130 Id.
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Second, the Court compared the context of the statutory
scheme at issue in Fedorenko to the context of the asylum statute.131
The DPA, which dealt with the horrors of the Holocaust, contained
no reference to culpability in its persecutor bar because “the crime
against humanity that is involved in the concentration camp puts it
into a different category.”132  Conversely, Congress enacted the
persecutor bar applied against Negusie as part of the Refugee Act
of 1980.133  The Refugee Act, unlike the narrowly targeted DPA,
provided guidelines for the treatment of all refugees, not just
Europeans displaced by World War II.134  In addition, Congress
passed the Refugee Act “to implement the principles agreed to in
the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees,” which did not prohibit a duress exception.135
The Court rejected the government’s claim that even if the
statute were ambiguous, the BIA’s interpretation was reasonable
and merited deference.136  Because the BIA incorrectly assumed
that Fedorenko controlled its interpretation of the persecutor bar in
the Refugee Act, the Court found that the BIA had been prevented
from fully considering the statutory question before it.137  Instead
of providing its own answer to the question of whether a duress
exception can be applied, the Court found itself bound by the “or-
dinary remand rule,” which required the agency to “bring its ex-
pertise to bear upon the matter” before the Court could interpret
the statute.138  As a result, the Court remanded Negusie’s case to
the BIA for reinterpretation.139
II. THE FUTURE OF THE PERSECUTOR BAR
The fate of the persecutor bar now rests in the hands of the
BIA.  The majority opinion in Negusie gave little explicit guidance
to the BIA and instead remanded to overcome what it considered a
misapplication of Fedorenko.140  The BIA now has two options.  First,
it could allow a duress defense to the persecutor bar, based on the
Court’s statement that Fedorenko improperly tainted the BIA’s inter-
131 Negusie v. Holder, No. 07-499, slip op. at 7.
132 Id. at 8 (quoting Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. at 511 n.32).
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Negusie v. Holder, No. 07-499, slip op. at 8.
137 Id. at 8–9.
138 Id. at 11–12.
139 Id. at 11.
140 See generally Negusie v. Holder, No. 07-499, slip op. (majority opinion).
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pretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), thereby opening the door to a
duress defense.  Alternatively, the BIA might simply apply the same
Fedorenko objective-effects standard but base it on different
grounds.
The BIA should allow a duress defense to the persecutor bar at
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).141  This Part presents four reasons why a
duress defense is both necessary and preferable.  It will conclude
by providing counter-analysis to Justice Scalia’s concurrence with
the majority opinion in Negusie, in which he argued against a du-
ress defense.142
A. Arguments in Support of a Duress Defense
1. Common-Sense Statutory Construction
Justice Stevens has consistently and compellingly insisted that
all persecutor bars, even those dealing specifically with former Na-
zis, must be interpreted subject to a duress defense.  In Negusie, he
repeated the common-sense argument he made twenty-eight years
prior in Fedorenko.143  “The Fedorenko Court’s construction of the
DPA threatened to exclude from the United States concentration
camp prisoners who were forced to assist the Nazis in the persecu-
tion of other prisoners.  In my view, this construction was insup-
portable . . . .  These prisoners were victims, not persecutors.”144
For the same reason, he argued that the persecutor bar in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42) must be applied subject to a duress defense.
Apart from Justice Stevens’s claim that it was bizarre to inter-
pret the persecutor bar such that it precludes many of the people
to whom the statute meant to grant asylum, he offered little sup-
port for his statutory interpretation argument.  However, well-es-
tablished canons of statutory interpretation validate this reasoning.
For example, it is clear that the Court must avoid interpretations
that would lead to “absurd or futile results.”145  Allowing a duress
defense comports with this principle of statutory construction and
141 This Article argues that a duress defense should also be applied to the other
persecutor bars that used the language of the Holtzman Amendment.  These persecu-
tor bars serve essentially the same purpose. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42),
1158(b)(2)(A)(i), 1182(a)(3)(E), 1231(b)(3)(B)(i).  This Part does not address the
persecutor bar in the DPA or the original Holtzman Amendment because they serve a
more specific purpose limited to World War II.
142 Negusie v. Holder, No. 07-499, slip op. (Scalia, J., concurring).
143 United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
144 Negusie v. Holder, No. 07-499, slip op. at 7–8 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
145 Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 400 (1966).
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common sense.  In contrast, to deny the asylum claim of an argua-
bly faultless refugee for actions that were beyond his control is
cruel and arbitrary.
2. Comparisons to Other Nations’ Persecutor Bars
The Refugee Act of 1980 implemented the United Nations
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 United
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, both of which
contain persecutor bars that turn on the word “crime.”146  Justice
Stevens supported his common-sense argument by referring to
these international predecessors of the Refugee Act.  “The lan-
guage of the Convention’s exception is critical: we do not normally
convict individuals of crimes when their actions are coerced or oth-
erwise involuntary.”147  The high stakes of the persecutor bar and
the nature of its international predecessors demonstrate that “‘mit-
igating circumstances’ must be considered in determining whether
an alien’s acts are of a ‘criminal nature.’”148  Duress is one such
mitigating factor.149
Furthermore, other countries that implemented these treaties
consistently limit the application of their persecutor bars to culpa-
ble, voluntary conduct.  For example, Canada, Australia, and the
United Kingdom have recently applied their versions of the perse-
cutor bar subject to a duress defense.150  This is notable because
these countries’ persecutor bars are based on the same interna-
tional agreements that form the foundation of the American perse-
cutor bar.151  While the Court may be unimpressed by
international precedent, this comparison should be especially com-
pelling given the international nature of asylum law.
146 Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1525 (2006); United Nations Convention Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees art. I, para. F, adopted July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137,
156 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954); see United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees art. I, para. 2, done Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. 267,
268 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967) (incorporating the definition of “refugee” set forth
in the preceding Convention, id., and thereby its persecutor bar).  The United States
is not a state party to the Convention, but it is a state party to the Protocol. UNITED
NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, STATES PARTIES TO THE 1951 CONVEN-
TION AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL, http://www.unhcr.org/3b73b0d63.html (Oct. 1, 2008).
147 Negusie v. Holder, No. 07-499, slip op. at 9 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2009) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
148 Id.
149 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(12) (2006).
150 See Brief for Scholars of International Refugee Law as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioner at 25–27, Negusie v. Holder, No. 07-499 (2009).
151 See id.
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3. Evolution of Persecution
Since the drafting of the first refugee statutes in the wake of
World War II, the nature of persecution has changed.  When Con-
gress drafted the DPA, persecution was generally more systematic
and overt than it is today.  The Holocaust is the best example of
this, having led to the extermination of millions of innocent peo-
ple.152  The word “genocide”153 and the legal concept of persecu-
tion154 were created to deal with this unprecedented horror.155
Against this backdrop, it is easy to understand why early construc-
tions of refugee statutes adopted a strict-liability persecutor bar—
no one who assisted the Nazis could claim to lack knowledge of the
brutality that took place across Europe because it had been so ex-
tensive and overt.  Similarly, because the persecution during the
Holocaust was so extreme, and the risk of admitting a former SS
officer or other mass murderer was so high, eliminating a duress
defense seemed necessary.  Finally, most of the world was in the
midst of a refugee crisis.156  Not every refugee could be guaranteed
asylum in stable countries, so those who had assisted the enemy,
whether voluntarily or not, were left behind.
With a number of gruesome exceptions, systematic persecu-
tion at the hands of centralized national governments has become
less common.157  Instead, much modern persecution is carried out
by dissident groups and military dictatorships in the context of civil
war.158  This form of persecution has a double impact, as exempli-
fied by the use of child soldiers.  First, these children are separated
from their families, tortured, drugged, and often killed without
152 See, e.g., Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 494, 494 n.2 (1981) (noting
that the Nazis slaughtered over 800,000 civilians at Treblinka alone, which the Court
described as a “human abattoir”).
153 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide art. II, adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
154 See Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, supra note 14, an-
nex I, pt. II(2) (denying refugee status to those who assisted in persecution).
155 See Daphne Anayiotos, The Cultural Genocide Debate: Should the U.N. Genocide Con-
vention Include a Provision on Cultural Genocide, or Should the Phenomenon be Encompassed
in a Separate International Treaty?, 22 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 99, 99 (2009).
156 See Matthew Lippman, The Pursuit of Nazi War Criminals in the United States and in
other Anglo-American Legal Systems, 29 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 1, 13 (1998) (explaining that
nearly eight million refugees became wards of the Allied Forces).
157 See Walls, supra note 12, at 236.
158 See The Secretary-General, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
for Children and Armed Conflict, para. 8–16, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/
61/275 (Aug. 17, 2006) (describing widespread kidnapping and coercion of chil-
dren); see also Walls, supra note 12, at 236 (describing the chaotic civil strife that gives
rise to modern persecution and lacks the clear boundaries of war between sovereign
nations).
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provocation.159  Second, because the combination of guerrilla war-
fare tactics and lightweight weapons make children effective
soldiers, child soldiers are persecuted once again when they are
forced to fight opposing forces and slaughter innocent people.160
K.S., for example, was nine years old and playing soccer after
school in Sierra Leone when rebel soldiers from the Revolution-
ary United Front ([ ]RUF[ ]) seized him and his playmates
around the same age. . . . About a month after his abduction,
K.S. tried to escape, but was caught.  The rebels held him down
and branded his upper arm with a hot iron. . . . The rebels told
K.S. that if he tried to escape again, they would cut off his arm.
They later slashed his hands and chest with a razor . . . [and]
burned K.S. with cigars for minor infractions, beat him over the
head with their guns, kicked him, and hit him.
. . . The RUF deliberately used drugs to desensitize the children
in their command, neutralize their terror, and increase their de-
pendence.  Under these conditions, K.S. was made to take part
in what he and the government agree were atrocities.161
Ishmael Beah, a former child soldier, highlighted the wide-
spread use of child soldiers in his testimony before Congress:
[T]here are thousands of children from ages [eight] to [seven-
teen] in Burma, Sri Lanka, Congo, Uganda, Ivory Coast, Colom-
bia, just to name a few places, that are being forced to fight and
lose their childhoods and their families.  They are maimed and
they lose their humanity, and these are the fortunate ones.162
This form of persecution through coercion is certainly not limited
to child soldiers.  “[T]he majority of refugees in the world today
are . . . fleeing from civil conflicts in which the distinction between
oppressor and oppressed is often unclear.”163
Unlike the concentration camps of World War II, which had
the goal of bringing quick and efficient death to as many as possi-
159 See Brief for Human Rights First et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner
at 21–24, Negusie v. Holder, No. 07-499 (2009), available at http://www.abanet.org/
publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/07-499_PetitionerAmCu4HumanRightsOrgs.
pdf.
160 See id. at 23–24.
161 Id. at 21–22 (explaining that when K.S.’s asylum case appeared before the immi-
gration court, the Department of Homeland Security cited Bah. v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d
348 (5th Cir. 2003), and Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981), to support its
claim that K.S. should be barred from seeking asylum because he engaged in the
persecution of others).
162 Casualties of War: Child Soldiers and the Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human
Rights and the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 7 (2007).
163 Matthew Happold, Excluding Children from Refugee Status: Child Soldiers and Article
1F of the Refugee Convention, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1131, 1131 (2002).
2009] NEGUSIE v. HOLDER 163
ble, many modern persecutors are intent only on achieving a form
of psychological death.164  These persecutors force their victims to
commit atrocities and violate cultural taboos in order to break
their spirits and ensure future cooperation or prevent dissent.165
The Pites¸ti “re-education” prison established by the Romanian
Communist government exemplifies this psychological persecution
through violation of the forum internum.166
At Pites¸ti, prisoners were thus forced to participate in persecu-
tion of fellow believers in two distinct ways: (1) through physical
torture of other prisoners and (2) through participation in cere-
monies they and their fellow believers believed to be blasphe-
mous.  Moreover, both forms of forced participation in
persecution had at least two victims; believers were the vehicles
of persecution for both themselves and others.167
More recently, both pro-government and rebel forces in Coˆte
d’Ivoire used sexual violence to subdue civilian populations and
break the spirits of their victims.168
It is unlikely that the Fedorenko Court envisioned a nine-year-
old child soldier or a torture victim fleeing religious persecution
when it established a rule that barred any refugee who participated
in persecution.  In fact, in voicing its support for the Holtzman
Amendment, the Department of State informed Congress that
“with the passage of time, [the persecutor bar] will be applicable to
an ever-decreasing number of aliens.”169  This means that the State
Department either did not anticipate the use of the Holtzman
Amendment’s broad language in other asylum statutes or that it
could not foresee the increasing prevalence of coerced persecu-
tors.  In either case, this prediction has proven false.
The persecutor bar impacts many refugees who have little in
common with the Nazi war criminals whom the harsh language of
the Holtzman Amendment intended to punish.  As Justice Stevens
stated most recently in Negusie, many refugees excluded by the per-
secutor bar have more in common with the victims of the Holocaust
164 See Brief for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 7–8, Negusie v. Holder, No. 07-499 (2009), available at http:/
/www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/07-499_PetitionerAmCu
BecketFnd16RelsOrgs.pdf.
165 See id. at 7–11.
166 See id. at 8–11.
167 Id. at 10.
168 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MY HEART IS CUT: SEXUAL VIOLENCE BY
REBELS AND PRO-GOVERNMENT FORCES IN COˆTE D’IVOIRE 21–85 (2007), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/cdi0807webwcover.pdf.
169 H.R. REP. NO. 95-1452, supra note 20, at 12.
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than with willful persecutors.170  The increase in coerced persecu-
tion will only exacerbate this problem unless a duress defense is
permitted.
4. Policy Goals of the INA
Applying the persecutor bar without considering a refugee’s
moral culpability clashes with the purpose of the INA’s refugee
provisions.  The Refugee Act of 1980, modifying the INA, defines
the INA’s purpose in broad and ideologically neutral terms—“to
respond to the urgent needs of persons subject to persecution in
their homelands.”171  This breadth ensures that refugees do not
flee their homelands to escape persecution on account of their
identity only to be denied asylum in the United States because of
that same identity.  Accordingly, the INA denies asylum to refugees
because of their past behavior or identity only in narrowly defined
situations.  For example, besides the persecutor bar, the INA bars
refugees who have serious criminal histories or present a threat to
the security of the United States.172  This Article suggests two possi-
ble rationales for denying asylum to these groups.  First, and most
obviously, it is against the interest of the United States to admit
refugees who might commit crimes against U.S. citizens or present
a threat to national security.  Second, denying access to criminals
and terrorists demonstrates disapproval of the actions of these
groups and may act as a deterrent to bad behavior.
To some degree, these goals justify the persecutor bar as
well.173  First, barring refugees who have persecuted others protects
U.S. citizens from potentially dangerous people.  More convinc-
ingly, barring persecutors is a powerful symbolic condemnation of
persecution.  However, both rationales break down in the case of
coerced persecution.  Refugees who have persecuted others only
because they were coerced to do so cannot be deemed as danger-
ous as people who willfully persecuted others.  Even if these refu-
170 See Negusie v. Holder, No. 07-499, slip op. at 8 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2009) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
171 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-212, § 101, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended at
8 U.S.C. § 1521 (2006)); see Walls, supra note 12, at 231.
172 8 U.S.C. §1158(b)(2)(A) (2006) (barring persecutors, people convicted of seri-
ous crimes, people who pose a threat to national security, and people who supported
terrorism).
173 Abbe L. Dienstag, Comment, Fedorenko v. United States: War Crimes, the Defense of
Duress, and American Nationality Law, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 120, 147–62 (1982) (discuss-
ing utilitarian, retributive, and symbolic rationales for allowing a duress defense to the
persecutor bar).
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gees had persecuted others willfully, there is evidence that they
would pose little threat to American citizens or national security:
Far from adhering to radical[,] right-wing philosophies or par-
ticipating in antidemocratic activities, most World War II Nazis
who have taken refuge in this country have led the lives of
model citizens.  Society has little to fear from even such of these
criminals who acted voluntarily.  It should face no threat whatso-
ever from those whom it adjudges coerced.174
Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, compellingly pointed out
that granting asylum to persecutors might result in persecutors and
their victims meeting each other in the United States.175  While
there is no evidence that former persecutors have ever sought out
or attacked their victims in America, it is obvious that even a brief
encounter could be extremely traumatic for persecutors’ victims.
However, in the case of a coerced persecutor like Daniel Negusie,
such a meeting would likely be much less traumatic.  Indeed, be-
cause Negusie aided his “victims” “on various occasions,”176 and be-
cause Negusie was himself a victim, it seems possible that the
encounter could provoke a sense of solidarity with Negusie, rather
than fear of him.
The symbolic disapproval and deterrence rationales also fail
under closer scrutiny.  First, harsh disapproval of coerced behavior
sends a confusing message.  Coerced behavior is rarely morally
blameworthy.177  Similarly, expressing disapproval of such behavior
distracts from the disapproval that should go to the willful persecu-
tor.  In fact, punishing coerced persecutors may shift sympathy
from the victim to the persecutor.178  Furthermore, demonstrating
disapproval of coerced behavior can have no deterrent effect.  Co-
erced behavior is involuntary, so no amount of disapproval will pre-
vent people from acting as persecutors while under duress.  Saving
disapproval for willful persecutors strengthens the symbolic power
174 Id. at 162–63.
175 Negusie v. Holder, No. 07-499, slip op. at 3 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2009) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) .
176 Id. at 3 (majority opinion).
177 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (1962) (detailing elements of duress defense in
the criminal context); Steven J. Mulroy, The Duress Defense’s Uncharted Terrain: Applying
it to Murder, Felony Murder, and the Mentally Retarded Defendant, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
159, 173 (2006) (“[V]irtually all civil[-]law nations permit duress as a complete de-
fense to all crimes, including homicide, while virtually all common-law jurisdictions
preclude the defense as it relates to the killing of innocent persons.”).  Even though
U.S. federal courts do not permit the defense of duress to a charge of homicide, some
individual states within the country do. Id. at 172–73.
178 See Dienstag, supra note 173, at 166.
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of the exclusion and avoids punishing people who could be consid-
ered morally blameless.
Finally, the application of a volitional element would bring the
persecutor bar into conformity with other provisions in the INA.
Maintaining a strict-liability persecutor bar when other analogous
provisions of the INA contain both explicit and implicit duress de-
fenses creates a confusing inconsistency.179  The BIA could solve
this problem simply by adding a volitional element to the persecu-
tor bar.
B. Scalia’s Concurrence: In Support of the Fedorenko Standard
Despite disavowing a preference for any particular outcome,
Justice Scalia provided the most compelling argument for main-
taining the Fedorenko objective-effects standard.  Justice Scalia,
joined by Justice Alito, concurred with the Court’s decision but
noted that he would not have agreed to remand if the BIA did not
have the option of leaving its interpretation of the statute un-
changed.180  Although Justice Scalia agreed that Fedorenko did not
apply to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), he provided three reasons why the
BIA should continue to apply the objective-effects test that grew
out of that decision.181
Justice Scalia first noted that the BIA is under no obligation to
apply a rule that in any way considers a refugee’s culpability for acts
committed under duress.182  Invoking the Nuremberg trials, he ex-
plained that duress is not a complete defense, and that it is inappli-
cable in the case of intentional killing or certain war crimes.183
“[T]hose who are coerced to commit wrong are at least sometimes
‘culpable’ enough to be treated as criminals.”184  Furthermore, im-
migration and asylum are not criminal in nature and do not re-
quire application of the same standards.  “Asylum is a benefit
accorded by grace, not by entitlement, and withholding that bene-
fit from all who have intentionally harmed others—whether under
coercion or not—is not unreasonable.”185
179 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(D)(ii) (2006) (declaring that membership in a totali-
tarian party will not render a refugee inadmissible if that membership was involun-
tary); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(H)(i) (barring human traffickers subject to an
explicit mens rea requirement).
180 Negusie v. Holder, No. 07-499, slip op. at 1 (Scalia, J., concurring).
181 Id. at 2–3.
182 Id. at 3.
183 Id. at 2.
184 Id.
185 Negusie v. Holder, No. 07-499, slip op. at 3 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Second, Scalia argued that, “in the context of immigration
law, ‘culpability’ as a relevant factor in determining admissibility is
only one facet of a more general consideration: desirability.”186  Be-
cause only a limited number of refugees can be granted asylum,
the BIA must have some means of choosing who may be admitted.
Those who engage in persecution, whether under duress or of
their own free will, may be considered less desirable than refugees
who never participated in persecuting others.  “If, for example, the
asylum laws grant entry to those who suffered the persecution,
might it not be imprudent to also grant entry to the coerced perse-
cutor, who may end up living in the same community as one of his
victims?”187
Finally, Justice Scalia claimed that a bright-line rule barring all
persecutors, whether coerced or not, might still be the best means
of reaching the statute’s goals.188  For example, a bright-line rule
would minimize the administrative burden inherent in asylum
cases.  “Immigration judges already face the overwhelming task of
attempting to recreate, by a limited number of witnesses speaking
through (often poor quality) translation, events that took place
years ago in foreign, usually impoverished countries.”189  Adding
claims of duress would further complicate an already complicated
process and increase the risk of admitting the un-coerced persecu-
tors the statute intends to bar.
While Justice Scalia’s argument presents valid concerns, it
overlooks several key factors.  First, he argued that the duress de-
fense does not excuse extreme behavior like murder, even in the
criminal law context.190  However, this does not mean that a duress
defense would not protect a substantial number of refugees who,
like Negusie, persecuted others but never committed an extreme
crime like murder.  The persecutor bar uses the extremely broad
language of the Holtzman Amendment and applies to people who
have merely participated in persecution.  As Justice Stevens noted,
participation in persecution could be inherent to “almost every as-
pect of life or death in a concentration camp.”191  As a result, a
duress defense would primarily benefit people who fall under the
persecutor bar only because they nominally assisted in the persecu-
tion of others.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Negusie v. Holder, No. 07-499, slip op. at 2 (Scalia, J., concurring).
191 Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 534 (1981).
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Justice Scalia’s next argument, that a coerced persecutor
might be “undesirable” as a refugee and should therefore be
barred from resettlement in the United States,192 overlooks the fact
that coerced behavior says nothing about a person’s inner charac-
ter.  Declaring refugees “undesirable” because they were forced to
persecute others makes American asylum law seem arbitrary.
Those who had the poor fortune of being forced to persecute
others should not have to bear the label of “undesirable” once they
make it to safety.
Finally, Justice Scalia incorrectly argued that a bright-line rule
would be justified because it might avoid mistakes and prevent in-
creasing the administrative burden on the BIA.193  The burden of
proof in asylum cases is already on the refugee.194  This means that
any refugee accused of persecuting others would have to prove that
he did so under duress.  While Justice Scalia correctly notes that
immigration judges often face the difficult task of recreating events
that occurred years in the past and in a foreign country, he overes-
timates the increased risk and cost of any error that might result.
Even without a duress defense, refugees must convince judges that
they satisfy the high standard set for traditional refugees.  It is un-
likely that an un-coerced persecutor could overcome the burden of
proof to show both that he was persecuted and that the persecution
he engaged in was under duress.  In terms of preventing human
suffering, the cost of letting a few such persecutors slip through
would not be as great as barring hundreds or thousands of refu-
gees from asylum with a bright-line rule.
If the BIA were to add a duress defense to the persecutor bar,
the actual outcome would not result in any dramatic change to the
broader structure of asylum law.  For example, because “the deci-
sion whether asylum should be granted to an eligible alien is com-
mitted to the Attorney General’s discretion,”195 the government
would not be forced to admit more refugees if a duress defense
applied.  A duress defense would simply free immigration judges to
admit coerced persecutors if they deemed it appropriate.  Adding a
duress defense will not allow a flood of new asylees into the United
States.  Instead, judges will no longer be forced to deny the asylum
claims of those who persecuted others while under duress.
192 Negusie v. Holder, No. 07-499, slip op. at 3 (Scalia, J., concurring).
193 Id.
194 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
195 INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 420 (1999).
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CONCLUSION
The BIA now has the freedom to craft a persecutor bar that
recognizes the defense of duress.  Because the goal of asylum law is
ultimately humanitarian, the BIA should leave the harsh, objective-
effects test of Fedorenko in the past.  Allowing refugees who assisted
in persecution under duress to distinguish themselves from their
persecutors would preserve America’s status as a refuge of sanity in
an increasingly confusing and dangerous world.

